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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: PUBLIC POLICY
AND THE VEST AT TIME OF INJURY RULE
AN iN-uRY arising out of and in the course of employment is com-
pensated, under the general rule, according to the workmen's compensa-
tion act in force at the time of the injury.' The employee's rights are
said to "vest" at that time and he is denied the benefit of post-injury
amendments increasing the awards in the compensation schedule or
allowing an award for an injury not previously compensable. The
Michigan Supreme Court, in two recent decisions, reached results in
conflict with this rule.
In Lahti v. Fosterling, a woodcutter was injured by a falling tree"
in October 1954. The workmen's compensation act in force at the
time of the injury4 required that the employer pay the employee's
hospitalization expenses for a maximum of four six-month periods.
Without a hearing before the workmen's compensation commission,
the employer assumed Lahti's hospitalization expenses for the maxi-
mum period. In 1955 the applicable section of the act was amended
to provide that the limits of the employer's liability should be within
the commission's discretion. In i956, Lahti applied to the commis-
'See, e.g., Snoka v. Industrial Comm'n, 412 Ill. x26, xo5 N.E.zd 716 (1952);
Price v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 322 Mass. 476, 78 N.E.2d 13 (1948) ; Yurko-
vich v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 132 Mont. 77, 314 P.2d 866 (x957); McBride v. Royal
Laundry Service Inc., 44 N.J. Super. 114, 129 A.zd 738 (9S7) Scariato v. No. 9
Coal Co., 176 Pa. Super. x, 1o6 A.zd 907 (1954).
'This result is compelled by statute in some states. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 645.z 1
(1957) ; WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 8.2x (1957). These statutes in effect determine
that no statute or amendment shall be construed to have retrospective effect unless clearly
and manifestly so intended by the legislature.
A number of jurisdictions have predetermined the issue of retrospective operation
by construing the workmen's compensation act as part of the employment contract.
When this is done, the employer's obligation is contractually fixed at the time of
injury. See, e.g., State ex rel. Conley v. Pennybacker, 131 W.Va. 442, 48 S.E.zd 9
(1948). In the event that the employer or employee, or both, may elect to come under
the act or not, then there is a basis for such incorporation. See Tarnow v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 331 Mich. 558, 5o N.W.2d 318 (1951). Where, however, the
act compulsively includes all workmen engaged in certain occupations, then such con-
struction is unwarranted. In such cases, the statute is incidental to the employment
and not to any contractual provisions between the employer and employee. See Rook-
ledge v. Garwood, 340 Mich. 444, 65 N.W.2d 785 (x954).
3 357 Mich. 578, 99 N.W.2d 490 (I959).
'MICH. COMP. LAWS § 412.4. (1948). *MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.t54 (1957).
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sion for a hearing and adjustment of his claim pursuant to the 1955
amendment. A referee, ruling that the employer's liability is fixed at
the time of injury, dismissed the claim. The workmen's compensation
appeal board affirmed. On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court
.held the amendment applicable and remanded the claim to the com-
mission for rehearing and redecision pursuant to the 1955 amendment.
While recognizing that statutes and amendments are generally inter-
preted prospectively," the court reasoned that, where there is no ex-
pression of legislative intent, the circumstances surrounding adoption
,of the amendment must be considered to determine if the legislature
intended retrospective operation.7 Since this amendment was adopted
to ease the financial burden on the employee whose injury required
extended hospitalization, the court deemed it remedial legislation that
should be given retrospective effect.8
In Barger v. City of Saginaw,9 claimant was the wife of a fireman
who died in January, 1943, following a heart attack suffered shortly
after conducting snow removal operations in subzero temperatures.
The workmen's compensation act in force at that time required as a
condition of recovery that the injury be accidential.' 0 An amendment
passed in July, 1943,"1 deleted the word "accidental." The Michigan
Supreme Court later held'2 that the amendment did not apply when
the injury was an aggravation of a pre-existing disease. However, in
OMCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 65 (x953).
7 357 Mich. at 589, 99 N.W.2d at 495.
8 "Believing as we do that no vested right or contractual right exists that prohibits
the legislature from making a change in the remnedies afforded employees under the
workmen's compensation law, and keeping in mind the express primary purpose of
"the act to transfer to industry the expense of injuries to employees growing out of and
in the course of their employment, it is apparent that the legislature intended
.' .. to substitute for the existing remedies under the act some expansion thereof. We
-firid from all facts and circumstances that the legislature intended the amendment
Ito be applicable to an existing award entered prior to the effective date of the amend-
ment and intended to allow .. . additional medical benefits even though all previous
benefit periods had been exhausted." Id. at 595, 99 N.W.2d at 499. (Emphasis
added.)
e 3 58 Mich. 423, xoo N.W.2d 2o8 (196o).
"
0 P.A. 1912 (ist Ex. Sess.), part 7, § x, added by P.A. 1937, No. 6x at 78.
" MICH. COMP. LAws § 417.1 (1948).
"2 "[1t can hardly be said that the 1943 amendment broadens the act to allow an
award in a case of aggravation of a pre-existing disease without an accident or fortuitous




1957, the court, reinterpreting the statute,'- held that the 1943 amend-
ment required only that the employee show that his injury was a
result of his normal work.'4 The history of the Barger case spans this
development of the law. The claim for death benefits submitted in
1944 was denied by the workmen's compensation commission. Leave
to appeal was granted by the Michigan Supreme Court, but, because
of the lack of a no-progress rule,'" the claim was not brought to issue
until January of I96O, when the commission's decision was reversed.
The opinion justifies the court's action on the grounds that the "per-
tinent provisions of the statute and case law as they bear on this set of
facts have been materially changed."'( The claim was thus remanded
for new findings in light of the 1957 reinterpretation of the 1943
amendment, which disposed of the requirement of accidental injury
as a condition of recovery. Claimant's rights were not, therefore, fixed
by the statute in force at the time of the injury but by the statute as
amended six months after her husband's death.
The Lahti and Barger decisions indicate that the Michigan Court
does not consider the date of injury the pivotal time for the determina-
tion of compensation rights. This is a marked departure from the
generally accepted rule,'7 which is predicated on the assumption that
all legislation affecting substantive rights must have been intended to
have prospective operation only, unless a contrary intent is clearly indi-
cated.' In Lahti, the court deemed the amendatory legislation
"1Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.zd 6t4 (1957);
Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich. 635, 83 N.W.2d 603 (-957).
14 348 Mich. at 58o, 83 N.W.2d at 6z8.
"
8 MICH. COURT RULE 7o(B), 352 Mich. xvii (x958).
"A fuller discussion of the rationale of the court's decision would have been helpful.
It is relevant to note that the Lahti case was decided less than two months prior tothc
date of decision in the Barger case. In both cases there was a divided court, with
Kelly, Dethmers, and Carr, JJ., dissenting. The bulk of justice Carr's dissent in the
Barger case is concerned with showing that the decedent's injury was unaccompanied
by a fortuitous eyent. He concludes, however, "The right to compensation is governed
by the law applicable at the time of death (January, 1943)
, 
and therefore, P.A. 19i3,
-.No. 2 -5, effective July 29, 1943 ...would not apply . ... " 358 Mich. at 427, 1o
N.W.zd at 210.
"'Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 30 Cal. 2d 388, x8z P.zd 159
(1947), contains a thorough exposition of the rationale of this rule, plus a vigorous
dissenting opinion.
"Id. at 396, 182 P.2d at 183. This conclusion is occasionally reached by stating
that the legislature is presumed to know the rules of statutory construction, hence
omission of a statement of intent in this regard is presumed to be indicative of intended
prospective operation. See Heil v. Big Horn Constr. Co., 65 Wyo. 175, 197 P.zd 69z
(1948).
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"remedial." This term is not usually given the broad meaning ascribed
to it by the Michigan court; rather, it is normally limited to legislation
that affects modes of procedure or confirms existing rights.'9 However,
in a sense, all statutes that purport to correct some existing defect or
remedy an injustice have a remedial character.20  It is believed that
the Michigan Court had in mind this broad meaning when it described
the legislation in the Lahti case as remedial.'
Upon analysis, it becomes apparent that the conflicting decisions of
courts confronted with this problem do not result from definitional
difficultiesi rather, courts differ as to the emphasis to be placed on
conflicting policy considerations. Thus, the question presented when an
amendment increases the employee's benefits or gives him a new right
to compensation is whether it is better social policy to impose an un-
anticipated cost on the employer than to deny the injured employee
the extended benefits created by a post-injury amendment. 2  The
labeling of amendments as "remedial" or "substantive" actually reflects
the choice made. Admittedly, the result of the Lahti and Barger cases
is that the employee's injury will cost his employer or his employer's
insurance carrier more than could have been anticipated at the time of
the injury.23 On the other hand, the injured employee's compensation
19 See generally, McCAFFEY, op. cit. supra note 7, § 70.
"0Ibid. See Levy v. Birnschein, 206 Wis. 486, 24o N.W. 14o (1932) ; z SCHNEIDER,
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 577 (2d ed. 1932).
2' If the post-injury amendment decreases the award for the type of injury sustained,
the general rule will work to the employee's advantage. See, e.g., Price v. Railway
Express Agency Inc., 322 Mass. 476, 78 N.E.zd 13 (1948). The policy influencing
the Michigan court's decisions indicate that the general rule would be followed in this
situation.
2 In the Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co. case, the court said, "[T]he injustice that might
be suffered by an employer if the amendment were applied retrospectively, would
afford an ample basis for an intentional difference in treatment of workmen injured
before and after adoption of the amendment." 30 Cal. 2d at 396, 182 P.zd at 16z.
Justice Carter, dissenting, remarked: "This philosophy inheres in the concept that
property rights are above personal rights and that laws granting benefits to employees
must not be so construed as to affect the status quo adverse to employer . . . . The
majority opinion is a product of the reactionary legalistic philosophy of an era
preceding . . . the Workman's Compensation Laws." Id. at 397, 182 P.zd at 163.
2' See Schmidt v. Wolf Contracting Co., 269 App. Div. 2o1, 55 N.Y.S.2d 16z
(194.5) 5 Hogan v. Lawlor & Cavanaugh Co., 286 App. Div. 6oo, 146 N.Y.S.2d xi9
(i955). In the Schmidt case, the court asserted that the legislature could not have
failed to include those receiving compensation on the effective date of the amendment.
The amendment was enacted during the war, and was labeled a wartime measure.
The California court, in Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co., 30 Cal. 2d at 396, 182 P.2d at 16z,
distinguished the Schmilt case on this ground. This distinction does not seem to have
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will not be based on a statute which has been determined by the legis-
laiure to be inadequate. Decisions such as Lahti and Barger extend
the effect of a legislative attempt to 'correct this inadequacy.
While the policy announced by the Michigan Court is appealing,
the practical value of these decisions must be considered in light of
countervailing circumstances, including problems of scope. The Lahti
case, for example, does not indicate whether the controlling factor was
that plaintiff's initial claim was not filed until after the effective date
of the amendment or whether the Michigan Court intended to promul-
gate a general rule of retrospective operation. If the latter was
intended, then the rule is at best uncertain, and likely to confuse the
commissions who must apply it. Conversely, if the decision is con-
strued to limit retrospective operation to cases in which the claim is not
filed until after the amendment becomes effective, then there will be no
significant effectuation of the court's avowed policy. For, in a situation
comparable to Lahti, the employer will not assume responsibility
voluntarily because of the attendant risk of statutory change. On the
other hand, the likelihood of such change occuring between the time
of injury and the filing of the claim is at best slight.
Barger v. City of Saginaw presents a more extreme holding, in-
asmuch as the injury was noncompensable when it occurred. Here
the policy of extending the benefit of statutory change must be balanced
against the cost of unanticipated liability. Moreover, the court gives
no guide by which to determine the scope of its decision. In contrast
is the relative certainty of the generally accepted "vest at time of
injury" rule. The difficulties inherent in judicial attempts to formulate
a rule of retrospective operation suggest that such formulation, if any,
should be left to legislative determination. Absent such determina-
tion, deviation from the general rule is unwarranted.
been given weight in subsequent New York decisions, e.g., Hogan v. Lawlor & Cavanaugh
Co., supra; Basarbavich's Estate v. Nat'l Housecleaning Contractors Inc., 275 App.
Div. 1oz, 91 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1949) i nor in the Lahti case, 357 Mich. 578, 99 N.W.zd
490 (.959).
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